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Policy Comment
A "Flip" Look at Predatory Lending:
Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End
Abusive Refinancing Practices?
The regulation of predatory loans can be a tedious business. The whole
topic redounds of such yawn-inducing terms as "single-premium credit
insurance" and "negative amortization." Yet the human costs of predatory
lending are no less real for all the financial jargon that masks them.
Thousands of Americans, especially minorities and the elderly, have lost
their homes due to sharp lending practices. The effective regulation of such
abusive lending, while not a very sexy endeavor, could markedly improve
the quality of life for some of the nation's most vulnerable people. This
reality has led thirteen states and several major cities to undertake statutory
and regulatory reform efforts in the past three years. The Federal Reserve
Board (Fed), too, has attempted to rein in predatory lending through the
recent promulgation of its revised standards under Regulation Z.
This Comment will attempt to analyze the potential efficacy of the
Fed's effort by examining a specific portion of the revised Regulation Z,
namely, its prohibition of so-called loan "flipping."' This rule forbids the
refinancing of any "high-cost loan' 2 within one year of its initiation, unless
that refinancing is "in the borrower's interest."3 The prosecutorial discretion
1. Loan flipping will be defined in more detail later in this Comment. See infra text
accompanying note 19. In essence, "flipping" is the early or frequent refinancing of a loan in
order to extract greater points and fees from a borrower.
2. Again, the term "high-cost loan" will be defined more fully later in this Comment. See
infra text accompanying note 14. For now it will suffice to say that a high-cost loan is a loan
subject to the substantive requirements of the Fed's predatory lending rules due to high interest
rates or fees.
3. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2002). I have chosen to analyze this provision for two reasons.
First, it is emblematic of the current crop of predatory lending reforms in its greater emphasis on
prosecutorial discretion; it can thus serve as a specific vehicle through which to explore the more
general strengths and weaknesses of the recent reform measures. Second, it covers all fifty states
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embedded within the new federal antiflipping provision represents a
potential improvement over the previous generation of predatory lending
regulations. This is because a discretionary standard better enables
regulators and judges to end illegitimate mortgage refinancings, while still
permitting others to go forward when warranted by individual
circumstances. Such a result can improve both the justice and efficiency of
the regulatory regime. Even so, like all other regulatory systems relying on
prosecutorial discretion, also present is the opportunity for over- and
underenforcement. In the case of the antiflipping provision, most of the
worry has been that the standard will be overenforced and cause the market
for legitimate subprime4 loans to dry up. This Comment argues that this
fear is overstated and that the real worry is underenforcement.
I
Predatory lending is a long-standing social problem. But its salience
was never greater than in the 1990s, when the market for subprime loans
exploded.5 The upside of this boom was that more low-income and high-
risk borrowers were able to gain access to the credit markets than ever
before-these borrowers helped fuel the expansion in personal spending at
the heart of the Clinton-era economy. The downside was a dramatic
increase in home foreclosures. During the eight years from 1993 to 2000,
overall foreclosures skyrocketed by sixty-eight percent; 6 in some urban
areas, such as Chicago, they as much as doubled.7 Although there is little
empirical evidence indicating how many of these subprime foreclosures
were due directly to predatory lending, anecdotal evidence suggests that
and appears to be a far hardier rule than those enacted at the state and local levels, which are
currently the targets of a federal preemption statute. Michele Heller, Federal Anti-Predator Bill
Ready for Introduction, AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 2003, at 3 ("Rep. Bob Ney plans today to
introduce a bill that would... preempt the city and state laws that lenders oppose.").
4. The term "subprime" is used to denote loans that carry higher interest rates or fees than are
typically found in "prime" market loans. There is nothing per se wrong with subprime loans
costing more. If lenders could not charge more to their riskier customers, then they would simply
fail to offer loans to low-income or high-risk borrowers at all. But while the economic rationale
for differentiating subprime from prime borrowers is sound, the potential for lenders to abuse
these borrowers is real. It is for this reason that predatory lending protections exist.
5. See Dennis Hevesi, New Curbs on Predatory Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 11, at I
([Iln 1993 there were 6.9 million loans originated in the entire mortgage market, of which
126,000 were subprime. By 2000, when a total of 7.8 million loans were made, 1.1 million were
subprime. The prime market had no growth, while the subprime market increased by a magnitude
of 7 .... (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6. See id.
7. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 580 (2002).
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loan predation was at least a contributing factor in a disturbingly high
percentage .
8
Such foreclosures impose huge personal and social costs on those
whom they affect, even indirectly. There are, first, the immediate personal
consequences for an individual involved in a foreclosure proceeding. That
person loses what is almost undoubtedly her most valuable economic asset,
in addition to giving up the simple security and stability of having
somewhere to call home. Substantial dignitary costs are also at stake. This
is especially true in a society like ours, where home ownership is
emphasized as a central pillar of the American Dream. Yet individuals do
not alone bear the costs of foreclosures; entire communities can feel the
consequences as well. Chicago's mayor, Richard Daley, described the way
that the effects of foreclosures have rippled through some neighborhoods in
his city:
We are seeing a pattern in the city and in the suburbs .... It's the
same story: A family has suddenly abandoned their home. In many
cases, it is elderly people who have lived there for many years ....
Once abandoned, these homes have been taken over by9 gangs and
drug people, and they become breeding places for crime.
The costs of predatory lending, then, are distressingly large-and not only
do they leave individual lives in shambles, but neighborhoods too.
Bad as this may seem, the situation is even more upsetting because it is
primarily the nation's minority and elderly communities upon whom such
lenders prey. Black Americans, for example, are five times more likely than
whites to refinance their homes in the subprime market. This remains true
even among affluent blacks, who are twice as likely to refinance their
homes in the subprime market as low-income whites.' 0 Elderly homeowners
are also the frequent targets of subprime lenders.1" The elderly are
particularly inviting to these lenders because they often need quick cash for
home repairs or retirement and already have significant equity in their
homes.' 2 What these demographics demonstrate is that the burdens of
8. See Hevesi, supra note 5; see also Sarah E. Lockyer, Fed Official Hints Predator Rules
Need Fine-Tuning, AM. BANKER, Nov. 1, 2002, at 11 ("'The predatory lending story is one of
anecdotes; it is very hard to get data,' [Fed Governor Edward] Gramlich said.").
9. James T. Berger, Subprime Lending Produces Dangerous Side-Effects, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
June 9, 2000, at 16N.
10. See Eggert, supra note 7, at 574.
11. The ideal customer for a subprime lender has been described as "an uneducated widow
who is on a fixed income .. who has her house paid off, is living offof credit cards, but having a
difficult time keeping up with her payments." Predatory Lending Practices: Hearing Before the
U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 31 (1998) (statement of "Jim Dough,"
anonymous representative of the financial services industry).
12. More equity up-front increases the collateral that a lender can collect in the event of a
foreclosure.
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subprime lending-especially the increased risks of loan predation and
foreclosure-fall heavily upon groups that, like minorities, still have
difficulty gaining access to prime credit markets or else, like the elderly,
tend to live on fixed incomes and be acutely vulnerable to the financial
stresses of a serious illness or other personal calamity.
Taken together, the consequences of predatory lending sound a call for
regulatory action. The next Part will offer a brief history of federal efforts
to rein in predatory lending-including an analysis of the shortcomings in
the regulatory framework of the mid-1990s that led the Fed to promulgate
new standards under the revised version of Regulation Z.
II
This basic structure of federal predatory lending regulation is set out in
a 1994 statute, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). 3
HOEPA creates a framework for the protection of borrowers taking out
certain subprime mortgages, the precise details of which are then filled in
and enforced by the Fed through Regulation Z. HOEPA's safeguards cover
home equity mortgages deemed to be "high cost," which Regulation Z
defines as a home equity mortgage meeting one of two threshold conditions
known respectively as the rate trigger and the fee trigger.1 4 Once one of
these triggers is satisfied, the HOEPA-Regulation Z regime mandates that
the lender give the borrower a set of basic disclosures three business days
before the loan is closed. 15 These disclosures are on top of the regular Truth
in Lending Act (TILA) requirements and, when combined with TILA's
three-day right to rescission, provide the consumer with at least six days to
reflect on the appropriateness of a particular loan.
16
Besides these disclosures and the cooling-off period, HOEPA-
Regulation Z loans are barred from incorporating certain terms, including:
(1) balloon payments in loans with a term of less than five years, (2)
payment schedules that are negatively amortized and thereby allow the
balance owed on a loan to increase rather than decrease, (3) increased
interest rates in the event of default, (4) certain prepayment penalties, and
(5) requirements that payments be bundled and paid in advance.' 7 These
13. Home Ownership and Equity and Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat.
2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
14. Prior to the recent revisions of Regulation Z, the rate trigger was met when the annual
percentage rate of the loan was more than ten percent greater than the yield on a Treasury security
with a maturity date comparable to the loan. The fee trigger was met when the total of all the
loan's points and fees payable at or before closing exceeded the greater of either $400 annually
adjusted for inflation, or eight percent of the total loan amount. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(A)-
(B) (2000).
15. See id. § 1639(a)-(b).
16. See Eggert, supra note 7, at 586.
17. See 15 U.S.C § 1639(c)-(g).
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terms have been deemed per se impermissible because they have long been
associated with predatory practices, and it is thought that there is little or no
legitimate reason for such terms to be included in a high-cost loan.
Viewed as a whole, the HOEPA-Regulation Z regime represents an
effort to provide protections and disclosures to borrowers of high-cost
loans, without unduly limiting the ability of these same low-income and
high-risk borrowers to obtain credit on the subprime markets. These are
precisely the right policy goals. They recognize that legitimate subprime
loans increase social welfare by helping borrowers gain access to loans that
they would not otherwise be able to obtain; they also recognize that
borrowers are infrequent players in the credit markets and consequently
need some protections to level the playing field in negotiations with repeat-
playing lenders. Yet just because these are the right aims does not mean that
they are easy to realize in practice. They are, in fact, extraordinarily
difficult to achieve.
Indeed, the initial HOEPA-Regulation Z standards did little to protect
at-risk borrowers. There are a couple of reasons why they fell short. First,
the rate and fee triggers were too easy to evade, especially for lenders
willing to charge interest rates and fees only slightly below the triggers
provided in the regulatory scheme. Evidence indicates that exactly the types
of unscrupulous lending practices the regulatory structure had been
designed to root out were proliferating in loans just beneath the triggers for
high-cost loan status.18 Second, and more relevant for our purposes, lenders
were able to obtain higher profits by more rapidly "flipping" the loan. Loan
flipping is defined as the "early or frequent refinancing of a loan, normally
with each new set of loan fees financed by the loan, so that the loan amount
continually rises, even while the homeowner makes her payments."' 9 For
example, since fees on an initial loan would not have applied to the
determination of whether a pair of refinancings of that loan are high-cost
mortgages, a lender could have charged a 7.5% fee three separate times in
rapid succession for three different loans, collecting fees totaling well over
20% of the loan amount, but without ever exceeding the 8% fee trigger.
Flipping became so common in the subprime industry that "'[s]ometimes
borrowers [would] have loans flipped four, five times and... [be] left with
18. One lender, for example, revealed how near its fees were to the fee trigger when it
estimated that ninety percent of its loans would be covered by HOEPA if only the fee trigger were
to include the cost of single-premium credit insurance. See Sandra Fleishman, Fed Favors
Tougher Loan Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at E 1; see also Carol Hazard, Predatory Loans
Often Set Up Borrowers for Failure and Can Cost Them Their Biggest Investment: Their Homes,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 2000, at A l (stating that Fed members heard "reports of lenders
skating just below the HOEPA requirements and still engaging in egregious practices").
19. See Eggert, supra note 7, at 515.
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no equity as points and fees strip[ped] out the value of their homes.' 20
Homes were essentially stolen from low-income Americans, and the laws
of the time could do nothing to stop it.
III
Recognizing the initial HOEPA-Regulation Z standards' shortcomings,
the Fed worked to tighten the restrictions on predatory lenders in a revised
version of its regulation. These amendments, effective December 20, 2001,
with compliance mandatory by October 1, 2002, seek to beef up the
HOEPA-Regulation Z regime through the following steps. First, they
reduce the rate trigger for first-lien mortgage loans from ten percentage
points to eight percentage points.' Second, while keeping the fee trigger at
the same percentage level, they change the relevant definition of fee to
include optional insurance, such as credit life, health, accident, or loss of
income insurance, as well as other debt-protection products financed by the
loan.22 These two revisions should help to solve the first major shortcoming
outlined above by making more subprime loans subject to HOEPA-
Regulation Z protections.
Third, the amendments to Regulation Z also take dead aim at ending
"flipping" by prohibiting a lender from refinancing one high-cost loan into
another within twelve months of the first loan's origination, unless that
refinancing is "in the borrower's interest. 23 The definition of "in the
borrower's interest" is left intentionally vague and does not offer a laundry
list of terms deemed to be per se impermissible in a loan refinancing. 24 It
instead places discretion in the hands of regulators and judges to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether the refinancing practices of a particular
subprime lender are so beyond the pale as to constitute predatory lending.
This emphasis on prosecutorial and judicial discretion through the
flexible standard of "in the borrower's interest" represents a potential
welfare improvement over the approach found in the previous generation of
20. See Hevesi, supra note 5 (quoting Sarah Ludwig, Executive Director of the Neighborhood
Economic Development Advocacy Project).
21. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2002).
22. Id. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii), (b)(1)(iv).
23. !d. § 226.34(a)(3).
24. According to the Fed:
[P]recisely defining circumstances that are "in the borrower's interest" is not necessary,
given the nature of the loan flipping prohibition.... The Board recognizes that this
approach places the primary burden on the creditor, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, to weigh whether the loan is in the borrower's interest. The standard is
intended to give legitimate creditors some flexibility for extenuating circumstances,
while creditors that rely on the exception routinely to "flip" HOEPA loans bear the risk
that a court will find that they violated HOEPA.
Prohibited Acts or Practices in Connection with Credit Secured by a Consumer's Dwelling, 66
Fed. Reg. 65,612, 65,613 (Dec. 20, 2001).
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predatory lending standards. Both rounds of regulation have held the same
pair of difficult-to-reconcile goals-reining in abusive lending practices,
while also permitting the extension of legitimate subprime loans. The
earlier effort attempted to accomplish these ends through a small number of
hard-and-fast rules. The problem was that predatory lenders proved too
nimble and exploited the regulatory gaps left to accommodate legitimate
subprime lenders. The Fed's new antiflipping provision works to fill in one
of these gaps and leaves the accommodation of legitimate subprime lenders
to the discretion of regulators and judges. Greater discretion is potentially
welfare-improving because it enables better filtering between permissible
and impermissible subprime loans. It thus still permits the gains of
legitimate subprime loans to accrue to lenders and borrowers, while more
ably limiting the personal and social drains associated with predatory loans.
Although the new antiflipping measure represents a potential welfare
improvement, it also carries with it a risk of over- or underenforcement, just
like any other regulatory regime relying on prosecutorial discretion. Fear of
overenforcement led banking lobbyists to oppose the antiflipping standard
vigorously in the lead-up to its adoption.25 They argued that uncertainty
over its meaning and the consequent likelihood of producing overzealous
enforcement would lead to a chilling of the market for legitimate subprime
loans. This, in turn, would destroy efficiency by denying loans to would-be
borrowers unable to obtain credit elsewhere. These fears have found little
support in the evidence, however. A nationwide survey of subprime lenders
conducted in the summer of 2002 by Morgan Stanley found that the volume
of subprime loans was expected to increase thirty-five percent over the
previous year.26 Such quick growth in the face of stronger regulation seems
a strong rebuttal to the overenforcement critique of the Fed's anti-loan-
flipping rule. This is doubly so since the market grew in the first year of the
new restriction, when uncertainty over the regulation and its potential
chilling effect should have been greatest.
The real worry, rather, is underenforcement. The evidence on the
continued growth of the market for subprime loans is consistent with two
separate hypotheses: that the new regulation is achieving the welfare gains
described above, or that it is being underenforced. Although the evidence is
as yet indeterminate, there are strong reasons for fearing the latter.
Legal efforts to enforce Regulation Z generally come from one of two
sources--enforcement actions undertaken by the Fed, or private actions
undertaken by the individual victims of a predatory lender. Neither of these
25. See id. at 65,612 ("[C]reditors believed that the standard's lack of certainty would subject
them to litigation risk."); Rob Blackwell, Industry Opposes Fed's Anti-Predator Proposal, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 23, 2001, at 3 ("[I]ndustry representatives countered that the [antiflipping
proposal] would set a dangerous precedent.").
26. Hevesi, supra note 5.
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loci of enforcement, unfortunately, may be especially well placed to end the
loan-flipping abuses of subprime predators. First, those directly harmed by
predatory lending seem an especially unlikely group to look to for
regulatory enforcement. Such individuals are, almost without exception,
lacking the financial resources necessary to mount an effective legal
campaign against sophisticated and well-funded financial institutions-and,
perversely, their dearth of resources has been at least exacerbated through
interactions with the very institutions they would look to sue.
This suggests that the Fed should enforce Regulation Z with heightened
vigor. Yet it has not been an especially zealous advocate on the predatory
lending front. For example, the Fed was slow in responding to the surge in
foreclosures during the mid-1990s; it took the Fed several years to begin to
formulate potential reforms to Regulation Z, even after it had become
apparent that its existing rules were not succeeding. 7 This reveals a more
fundamental point about the Fed as a predatory lending regulator-since its
primary mission is the safety and soundness of the banking system, not
consumer protection, it tends to be more sympathetic to the concerns of
those in the banking industry than those who worry about the abuses of that
industry. Furthermore, even given its relative insulation from the political
process, the recent shift in congressional power could reinforce the Fed's
inclination toward foot dragging on consumer protection measures, such as
the loan-flipping prohibition discussed here. 28 Empirical evidence is
beginning to back these claims. Although the antiflipping provision has
been fully mandatory since October 1, 2002, the Fed has initiated no
enforcement actions for violations of this provision of Regulation Z.
2 9
IV
The Fed's antiflipping provision may lead to gains in social welfare,
but only if the subprime market is actively policed for the kinds of abuses
that history shows predatory lenders are willing to inflict. As I have argued,
there are strong reasons to suspect that such "active policing" may fail to
occur, in which case policymakers will have to think carefully about the
next steps in the predatory lending battle. In the meantime, we can only
hope that the Fed embraces its prosecutorial grant and protects the interests
of those dependent on the HOEPA-Regulation Z safeguards.
-Michael J. Pyle
27. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1341 (2002).
28. Telephone Interview with Patricia A. McCoy, Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Connecticut School of Law (Nov. 26, 2002).
29. Telephone Interview with David Stein, Attorney, Federal Reserve Board of Governors
(Mar. 6, 2003).
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